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Do Venture Capital Firms Benefit from a Presence on  
Boards of Directors of Mature Public Companies? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the benefits to venture capital firms of their officers holding 
directorships in mature public companies in terms of fundraising and investment 
performance. Our empirical results show that venture capital firms raise more funds, set 
higher fund-raising targets, and are more likely to successfully exit their investments 
post-appointment of their officers to boards of directors of S&P 1500 companies. 
Directorship status in mature public firms provides venture capital firms with enhanced 
networks, visibility, and credibility, all of which facilitate their fundraising activities. In 
addition, the knowledge, expertise, and experience acquired through holding 
directorships in mature public firms are beneficial for their portfolio companies, as 
measured by the likelihood of successful exits.  
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Introduction 
Venture capitalists (VCs) have long been recognized as providers of capital, and 
monitors of small and young businesses. However, 9&V¶ UROHV LQPDWXUHSXEOLF ILUPV
have only recently been brought to the attention of academics and professionals. 
Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2012) documented the fact that 30.5 percent of 
Standard & Poor¶V (S&P) 1500 companies¶ directors had a VC background prior to their 
board appointments. They found that the presence of VCs on boards of directors is 
strongly associated with greater innovation activity by mature firms. In addition, the 
presence of VCs also increases the likelihood that mature firms will acquire a 
VC-backed company, will establish strategic alliances with other VC-backed companies, 
and will undertake corporate venture capital investments in start-up companies. Because 
the focus of their study was on the benefits to mature firms of having VCs on their 
boards, the question of whether or not VC firms benefit by having a presence on the 
boards of mature public companies thus remains unexplored. In this paper, we aim to 
fill this gap by examining this unanswered question. We investigate the potential (but 
crucial) benefits to VC firms, which are mainly in the areas of fundraising and 
investment performance.  
We followed Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2012) to construct our VC director 
sample, which covers the period from 1998 to 2011. Our final sample consists of 1,359 
unique VC directors working in 700 different VC firms. We collect VC fundraising, 
investment, firm, and exit data from VentureXpert, which has been used extensively in 
previous studies (Nahata, 2008; Cumming and Dai, 2010). 
 
The first benefit we examine is VC fundraising, which a number of previous studies 
have also examined (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Gompers, 1996; Jeng and Wells, 2000; 
3 
 
Mayer et al., 2004). In general, these studies have found that reputation increases VC 
ILUPV¶DELOLW\WRUDLVHQHZFDSLWDODQGUHSXWDWLRQLVDFKLHYHGby quickly taking portfolio 
companies public (i.e., VC ³JUDQGVWDQGLQJ´). In our study, we postulate that holding 
directorships in mature public companies also increases 9& ILUPV¶ reputation and 
improves their fundraising performance, because having a presence on the boards of 
S&P 1500 companies provides these firms with visibility, credibility, and enhanced 
networks (Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani, 2012). Although our analysis indicates that 
a significant difference exists between VC firms with and those without directorships, 
such difference could be due either to selection or treatment effects. We address these 
concerns by comparing fundraising performance during pre- and post-directorship 
appointment periods, and find that better performance results from holding directorships. 
In addition, we use the difference-in-difference method to address any concern that the 
difference could be due to economic effects (i.e., VC firms raise more funds when the 
economy is booming), and our results remain quantitatively the same. Overall, our 
results show that directorships in mature public companies benefit VC firms in terms of 
fundraising performance. 
The second benefit we examine is VC investment performance. A number of recent 
VWXGLHVKDYHH[DPLQHG9&ILUPV¶ UROHs as knowledge intermediaries (González-Uribe, 
2013; Dessi and Yin, 2014). These studies have shown that VC investors can 
communicate valuable knowledge to entrepreneurs, and to other portfolio companies, 
thus facilitating innovation. Based on these earlier findings, we question whether or not 
VC firms can also transfer knowledge and experience gained from holding directorships 
in mature public companies to their small non-public portfolio companies, and thus 
improve their investment performance, as measured by the likelihood of a successful 
exit (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Nahata, 2008). Our empirical results 
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show that VCs improve their ILUPV¶investment performance after their officers become 
directors of mature public companies, and better investment performance is due to their 
status as directors and not to their ILUPV¶reputation during the pre-appointment period. 
Overall, our results show that VCs benefit from their directorships in S&P 1500 
companies in terms of both fundraising and investment performance. Specifically, VC 
firms raise more funds, set higher fundraising targets, and have a higher likelihood of 
successful exits after having a presence on the boards of directors of mature public 
companies. These results are consistent when controlling for a matched sample of VC 
firms with similar reputation, but without directorships in mature public companies.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights related studies 
and proposes testable hypotheses; Section 3 provides an outline of the study, and 
discusses data and methodology; Section 4 analyses the empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
Literature review and hypothesis development  
VC characteristics and directorships 
Before analyzing the potential benefits that accrue to VC firms, we focus on the 
characteristics of VC firms that make them more likely to build connections with public 
companies. As suggested by Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2012), mature public 
companies select directors with VC backgrounds based on the anticipated experience 
and expertise they bring.1 VCV¶ experience and reputation within the VC industry are 
WKHUHIRUH OLNHO\ WR LQIOXHQFH SXEOLF FRPSDQLHV¶ FKRLFHV DQG GHFLVLRQV :H XVH LQLWLDO
public offering (IPO) market share and VC investment share to measure VC firmV¶
                                                             
1
 For instance, in an article in the Silicon Valley Business Journal (23 June 2014), Intel announced that 
Aneel Bhusri, CEO of Greylock Partners, had joined the company¶s board. Intel said: ³We are very 
pleased to have Aneel Bhusri as an Intel director. His more than 20 years¶ experience in enterprise 
software innovation and cloud computing will increase our board¶s depth in areas that are key to Intel¶s 
business and crucial in today¶s connected world.´ 
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reputation, in a similar manner to that of Nahata (2008) and Krishnan et al. (2011). We 
measure IPO market share as the dollar market value of all companies taken public by 
the VC firm from the beginning of calendar year 1980 up until a given calendar year, 
normalized by the aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies that went public 
during those years. The VC investment share is the dollar investment made by a VC 
firm from the beginning of 1980 up until a given calendar year, normalized by the 
overall aggregate investment in the VC industry in those years. We postulate that 
reputable VC firms, which have higher IPO market share and VC investment shares, are 
more visible and potentially more valuable to mature public companies, and hence their 
officers are more likely to obtain board seats. 
In addition to reputation, we also examine other characteristics of VC firms. 
Specifically, we examined their age, size, location, and type. We use the total number of 
years a firm had experience as a VC investor (Cumming et al., 2006) as a measure of 
9& ILUPV¶ H[SHULHQFH :H SRVLW WKDW EHFDXVH ROGHU 9& ILUPV DUH PRUH H[SHULHQFHG
knowledgeable, and credible, their officers are more likely to be selected as directors by 
S&P 1500 companies. We classify all VC firms into two categories: ³,ndependent VCs´ 
i.e., those VC firms that are traditionally not affiliated with any corporations, banks, or 
governments, DQG ³RWKHUV´ LH those with such affiliations. Given that S&P 1500 
companies invite VCs to join their boards to add value, it is unlikely that they would 
invite non-independent VCs to join their boards of directors. 2  Officers of such 
³FDSWLYH´ VC firms, especially corporate VC firms, are thus far less likely to attain 
directorships than are independent VCs. 
 Finally, we examine whether or not the location of VC firms influences the 
likelihood of WKHLURIILFHUV¶obtaining directorships. VCs based in U.S. venture hotbeds 
                                                             
2
 For instance, it is unlikely that the semiconductor company Qualcomm would consider inviting 
someone from Intel Capital to join its board of directors. 
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(California and New York State) are exposed to more entrepreneurial activities than 
those based in other states (Gompers et al., 2005). These VCs are likely to be more 
experienced in evaluating and cultivating young firms than other VC firms, an attribute 
that is potentially extremely valuable to S&P 1500 companies.3 We therefore posit that 
VCs based in venture hotbeds are more likely to obtain directorships than others. Based 
on the above discussion, we develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: More reputable, older, larger, and independent VC firms, and those based 
in venture hotbeds, are more likely than others to have a presence on boards of directors 
of S&P 1500 companies.  
Directorships and VC fundraising 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) examined the fundraising process within the context of the 
U.S. VC market and found that economic growth, R&D expenditures, and firm-specific 
reputation and performance influence fundraising. Further, they found that VC firms 
tend to hold larger equity stakes in firms that have recently gone public in order to raise 
greater amounts of money. A related study by Gompers (1996) showed that young VC 
firms tend to rush to IPOs in order to facilitate their future fundraising. Evidence from 
outside the United States also shows similar findings. Jeng and Wells (2000) and Mayer 
et al. (2004) examined the impact of a series of factors such as IPOs, accounting 
standards, labour markets, and economic growth on the ability of VC firms to raise new 
capital. They showed that the ability to take companies public determines the ability to 
raise new capital. 
Our analysis extends prior studies by incorporating another potentially important 
determinant of VC fundraising: reputation. Previous studies have found that a good VC 
                                                             
3
 For example, generally speaking, a VC firm based in California would be more appealing to S&P 1500 
companies than would a VC firm based in Nebraska. 
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reputation, achieved by bringing portfolio companies to IPOs as early as possible, i.e., 
E\³JUDQGVWDQGLQJ´*RPpers, 1996), LQFUHDVHV9&ILUPV¶DELOLWLHVWRUDLVHQHZFDSLWDO
We postulate, however, that VC firms can gain reputation through directorships in 
mature public companies. Board seats in S&P 1500 companies provide visibility, 
credibility, and enhanced networks for VC professionals, which are likely, in turn, to 
LPSURYH9&ILUPV¶DELOLW\WRUDLVHQHZFDSLWDO7KHPHDVXUHVZHXVHDUHWRWDODPRXQWV
raised and target amounts. The total amount equals the sum of all funds raised by a 
particular VC firm during the sampling period (1980±2013); the target amount is the 
sum of all target funds of VC firms during the sampling period. The total amount raised 
objectively measures the results of fundraising, while the target amount captures VC 
ILUPV¶VXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQ. We posit that VC firms, after obtaining directorships, are 
not only better able to raise new funds, but also become more confident in their ability 
to raise funds. Therefore, we hypothesise that directorships in S&P 1500 companies will 
increase the total amount VC firms raise, and the target amounts VC firms set: 
Hypothesis 2a: Directorships in S&P 1500 companies will increase the total amounts 
VC firms raise.  
Hypothesis 2b: Directorships in S&P 1500 companies will increase the target amounts 
that VC firms set.  
Directorships and investment performance 
Various studies, including those by Giot and Schwienbacher (2007), and Isaksson 
(2007), have examined VC exits in different contexts. A large body of literature has 
concluded that exits are influenced by various factors. These studies have reported that 
the characteristics of VC firms and investee companies affect the likelihood of exits 
(Elisabete, Cesaltina, and Mohamed, 2008). Others (Cumming et al., 2006; Cumming 
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and MacIntosh, 2003) have found that better economic conditions and legal 
environments increase the likelihood of exits. In addition, VC syndication (Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Lerner, 1994; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007), geographical distance, 
and cultural disparity (Cumming and Dai, 2010) also LQIOXHQFH9&VILUPV¶H[LWVZLWKLQ
the context of cross-border VC investments. 
2QO\ UHFHQWO\ KDYH 9& ILUPV¶ UROHV LQ PDWXUH SXEOLF ILUPV EHHQ the subject of 
attention. Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani¶V VWXG\ IRXQG WKDW9&GLUHFWRUV LQ
mature publiFFRPSDQLHVVLJQLILFDQWO\LPSURYHSXEOLFFRPSDQLHV¶LQQRYDWLRQDFWLYLWLHV
Following Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani  (2012) and González-Uribe (2013), 
Dessi and Yin (2014) further examined the VC GLUHFWRUV¶ role as knowledge 
intermediaries. For instance, they found that VC directors can communicate valuable 
knowledge to entrepreneurs, and to other portfolio companies, thus facilitating 
innovation.  
In the current study we measure investment performance by the likelihood of a 
successful exit, a factor that has been used extensively in previous studies (Cumming 
and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Nahata, 2008). We postulate that being on the board of 
mature public companies provides VC professionals access to better knowledge and 
experience of the product, market, and the industry, all of which can be transferred to 
their portfolio companies and consequently improve WKH ODWWHU¶Vperformance. In other 
words, VC firms benefit from holding directorships in mature public companies through 
their ability to take their portfolio companies to successful exits. We therefore propose 
our third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Directorships in S&P 1500 companies will increase the likelihood of a 
successful exit.  
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Data and methodology  
Data and sample 
We follow the methodology of Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2012) to 
construct our initial sample. We collect director data from the RiskMetrics4 database, 
which provides information on directors of S&P 1500 firms from 1996 onwards. The 
RiskMetrics database reports thHGLUHFWRUV¶SULPDU\HPSOR\PHQWFRPPLWWHHVWKH\VHUYH
on, their board affiliations, shares held, total voting power, and other factors. Our 
sample covers U.S. companies from 1998 to 2011, and extends the sample studied by 
Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2012).5 To identify VC directors, we adopt a 
two-step method. In the first step, we search for keywords that might define a VC firm 
in four different employment-related data items provided by RiskMetrics for each 
individual director.6 These employment-related data items are the primary company 
name, employment category, other employment title, and type of services for each 
director. If at least one of the keywords we search is available in any of these data items, 
we consider that individual as a potential VC director. In the second step, we 
hand-collect information on VC director candidates from the VentureXpert database in 
the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. We only record candidates as VC 
directors if they are from VC firms in the VentureXpert database; this procedure avoids 
including directors that may have self-described themselves as a venture capitalist based 
on their experience as a private investor, but who lack the skills and networks associated 
with working at a VC firm. After these two steps, we identify 1,359 unique VC directors 
ZRUNLQJLQGLIIHUHQW9&ILUPV,QDGGLWLRQZHFROOHFWLQIRUPDWLRQRQ9&GLUHFWRUV¶
                                                             
4
 Formerly known as the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). 
5
 Our sample starts in 1998 because this is the first year that the IRRC database collected primary 
employment data on directors, which is one of the main data items needed for our analysis.  
6
 The keywords are: venture, capital, partner, fund, investor, angel, finance, financial, and management. 
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year of joining their respective boards in order to measure the starting point of potential 
benefits more accurately.7 For instance, if a VC became a director of Company A in 
2006 but joined VC firm B in 2009, we consider 2009 as the benefit starting point, 
UDWKHUWKDQ:HFROOHFW WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQSULPDULO\IURP9&ILUPV¶ZHEVLWHVZLWK
supplementary sources such as Bloomberg and Forbes. We collect fundraising, VC 
investments, VC firms, and exits data from VentureXpert (SDC Platinum), which is the 
official database used by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), and has 
been used extensively in previous studies. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the statistics of our sample. Panel A shows VC 
ILUPV¶GLUHFWRUVKLSVLQ6	3FRPSDQLHV$VVKRZQduring the sample period, each 
VC firm was associated, on average, with two S&P 1500 companies, while the 
maximum number ranged up to 25. This suggests that there are significant differences 
among VC firms in terms of their affiliations with public companies. The majority of 
firms were associated with one S&P 1500 company, while only a small number of VC 
firms had multiple affiliations. In addition, as shown in the table, it is common for VC 
firms to send multiple officers to sit on boards, as suggested by the number of directors 
per VC firm on the boards of S&P 1500 companies. Similarly, S&P 1500 companies 
usually invite more than one VC director to sit on their boards. Again, these numbers 
vary significantly among different VC firms. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics 
RI9&GLUHFWRUV¶H[SHULHQFH  
As shown in the table, most VC directors joined S&P 1500 boards around 1999, 
and most VCs joined/started the VC firm around the same time. As discussed above, 
there are two types of VC directors in our sample: 1) those who directors joined the 
S&P 1500 board first, then joined/started the VC firm (15 percent); and 2) those who 
                                                             
7
 We also collect the job title of each VC director in the VC firm, although we only recorded the title of 
the VC director if he or she was a founder of the VC firm, because other titles are time-varying.  
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started their careers as venture capitalists, then became directors of S&P 1500 
companies (85 percent). In the first case, these individuals stayed on the boards for 
approximately six years before they joined/started their VC firm. In the second instance, 
the individuals spent an average of seven years in a VC firm before starting their 
GLUHFWRUVKLSVLQ6	3FRPSDQLHV3DQHO&GHVFULEHV9&GLUHFWRUV¶UROHVZLWKLQWKH
VC firm and the S&P 1500 company. We find that 37 percent of our VC directors were 
the founder/co-founder of the VC firms with which they were associated, suggesting 
that S&P 1500 companies tend to favor the most experienced and reputable VCs in the 
LQGXVWU\,QWHUPVRI9&GLUHFWRUV¶UROHVZLWKLQWKH6	3FRPSDQLHVSHUFHQWKHOG
chair/vice-chair positions; 8 percent held CEO, CFO, and/or COO positions; and 9 
percent held president/vice-president positions. The majority (82 percent), however, did 
not hold the above positions. This is also shown by the classification of ³GLUHFWRUVKLS´: 
77 percent of VC directors were independent, while only 22 percent were employees or 
otherwise linked to the S&P 1500 companies. These results suggest that large public 
companies invite VC directors mostly for their experience and expertise in the field, 
rather than for their management skills.  
In summary, our results show that VC firms tend to send multiple officers to sit on 
the boards of S&P 1500 companies; the majority of VC directors started their careers as 
venture capitalists, and only later joined S&P 1500 boards; and only a small proportion 
of VC directors hold positions such as chair, CEO, or CFO within the S&P 1500 
companies, while the majority are independent.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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Dependent variables 
The dependent variable across all models in Table 4 is a dummy variable, which takes 
the value of one if a specific VC firm obtained at least one directorship in an S&P 1500 
company in that particular year, and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in Table 6 
are either the natural logarithm of the total amount raised or the target amount. The 
dependent variable in Models 1±3 of Table 8 is a dummy that takes the value of one if 
the investee company was exited through IPO and/or mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
by the end of 2012, and zero otherwise. We consider both IPOs and M&As to be 
successful exits (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Nahata, 2008). In Models 
4±6 of Table 8, the dependent variable is the time to exit, calculated by taking the 
difference between the year in which the portfolio company received its initial funding 
and the observation year, or the end of 2012. 
Determinants of VC directorship 
Directorship 
Directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm had at least 
one partner sitting on the board of an S&P 1500 company, and zero if the VC firm 
obtained no directorships during the sampling period. 
Post-directorship 
The post-directorship variable is only observable for VC firms that obtained 
directorships during the sampling period, and is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the VC firm had existing directorships in S&P 1500 companies, and zero if the  
VC firm had not yet obtained a directorship. 
Directorship length 
The directorship length variable is only observable for VC firms that obtained 
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directorships during the sampling period. We measure this as the number of years 
between the year in which a VC firm obtained a directorship and the observation year. 
Control variables 
In our analysis of directorship and VC fundraising, we follow Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) by including several variables to control for VC firm characteristics. For instance, 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) found that older and larger VC firms are more likely to 
raise larger amounts of funds than are younger and smaller ones. A better economic  
environment, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the previous year, 
DOVR IDFLOLWDWHV 9& ILUPV¶ IXQG-raising abilities. In addition to VC firm age, size, and 
GDP growth, we also include VC firm type, location, and year dummies to control for 
other VC firm characteristics and year fixed effects in our models.  
In our analysis of investment performance, we follow Nahata (2008) by including 
variables to control for characteristics of VC firms, portfolio companies, and deal 
characWHULVWLFV :H LQFOXGH 9& ILUP DJH ,32 PDUNHW VKDUH WR FRQWURO IRU 9& ILUPV¶
experience), and reputation (Nahata, 2008). We also control for venture-related 
characteristics. We include seed/start-up stage, early stage, expansion stage, and later 
stage dummies in our analysis. We include these variables because previous studies 
have suggested that early-stage ventures are risky and have high odds for failure 
(Cochrane, 2005), and also because the level of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
are higher at the early than at the later stage (Dai et al., 2012). VC syndication is also 
important and can systematically reduce the level of uncertainty. Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) and Lerner (1994) found that VC syndication is positively related to the 
likelihood of IPO exits. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) found that the larger the size of 
VC syndication, the shorter the time to exit a portfolio company. Therefore, we include 
syndicate size, which is the total number of VC firms invested in a particular portfolio 
14 
 
company. To control for other characteristics of VC firms, we include VC type dummies 
to indicate different types of VC firms. In addition, we account for venture industry and 
year-specific fixed effects by including industry dummies and year dummies in our 
estimations; we also include total funding received to control for investment size. 
Estimation models 
a. Logit model  
We use a logit model to estimate the likelihood of becoming directors and investment 
performance (at the company level). Since the dependent variables in both analyses are 
binary in nature, we apply a logit model. The basic function of the non-linear model is 
described as: 
 
                                                       (1) 
 
In Table 4,  is the probability of having at least one partner sitting on the board of an 
S&P 1500 company for the ith year;  equals 1 if the VC firm had at least one 
directorship in an S&P 1500 company, and 0 otherwise. Equation (1) is as follows:  
 
                                          (2) 
Where  is the constant, and  to  are coefficients of independent variables  
to . The analytical form of the logit model in Table 4 is as follows: 
 
                                                                        (3) 
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Where VC firm reputation is measured by two proxies: the first, IPO market share, is 
the dollar market value of all companies taken public by the VC firm from the 
beginning of calendar year 1980 up until a given calendar year, normalized by the 
aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies that went public from the 
beginning of 1980 up until the same calendar year. The second, VC investment share, is 
the dollar investment from the beginning of 1980 up until a given calendar year, 
normalized by the overall aggregate investment in the VC industry in those years. VC 
firm age is PHDVXUHG E\ WKH SHULRG EHWZHHQ 9& ILUPV¶ \HDU RI LQFRUSRUDWLRQ DQG WKH
observation year. VC firm size LVWKH9&ILUPV¶FDSLWDOXQGHUPDQDJHPHQWLQDSDUWLFXODU
year, calculated by taking the sum of all previous funds raised by the VC firm. VC firm 
type is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm was not 
affiliated with any other entities, and zero otherwise. VC firm location is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm was based in either California or New 
York State; year dummies are dummy variables that indicate the observation year. 
 
In Table 8,  in equation (1) is the estimated probability of a successful exit for the ith 
investment;  equals 1 if the company was successfully exited by the end of 2012, and 
equals 0 otherwise. u is the normal linear regression model. The analytical form of the 
logit model in Table 8 (Models 1±3) is the following: 
 
                                                                          (4) 
 
where 9& ILUP¶V GLUHFWRUVKLS is measured by three proxies. Directorship is a dummy 
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variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio company received funding from at 
least one VC firm with directorships, and zero otherwise. Post-directorship is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the year in which a portfolio company received its 
initial funding was during the post-directorship period, and zero otherwise. Directorship 
length is the number of years between the year in which a VC firm obtained 
directorships and the observation year. VC firm age is measured by the period between 
VC ILUPV¶ \HDU RI LQFRUSRUDWLRQ DQG WKH REVHUYDWLRQ \HDU VC firm reputation is 
measured by IPO market share, which is the dollar market value of all companies taken 
public by the VC firm from the beginning of calendar year 1980 up until a given 
calendar year, normalized by the aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies 
that went public from the beginning of 1980 up until the same calendar year. VC firm 
location is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm was based in 
either California or New York State (venture hotbeds), and zero otherwise. Venture stage 
is measured by three dummies that indicate the stage of the portfolio company when it 
received its first funding. VC syndicate size is the number of VC firms that invested in 
the portfolio company. VC firm type is measured by two dummy variables that indicate 
whether the VC firms were affiliated with a corporation or a bank. Total funding is the 
total amount that the portfolio company received across all rounds. Year dummies and 
industry dummies are dummy variables that indicate the observation year and the 
SRUWIROLRFRPSDQ\¶VLQGXVWU\UHVSHFWLYHO\ 
The log transformation of the logistic model is given by: 
                          (5) 
 
We estimate the parameters through the maximum likelihood method. To test the 
statistical significance of the predictor variable, we use the Wald test. Pseudo  is 
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used to measure the goodness fit of the model. Pseudo  is similar to  in the 
ordinary least squares (OLS): the larger the pseudo , the better the goodness of fit. 
b. Heckman two-stage model 
In our analysis of directorship and VC fund-raising, we use a Heckman two-stage model, 
which estimates two equations. The first stage is the probability of raising a fund in a 
particular year:  
Stage 1:  
                                                                     (6) 
The second stage is the estimation of the amount raised (or target size), given that the 
funds were raised in that year:  
 
 
                                                                    (7) 
c. Cox proportional hazard model 
We examine the ³time-to-H[LW´/exit rate using a Cox proportional hazard model in Table 
8 (Models 4±6). This model is used in our company-level analysis. The dependent 
variable is the hazard rate, which is the probability of exiting an investment, given that 
the exits have not occurred. The following is the hazard model:  
 
                                      (8) 
 
Where  is the proportional hazard rate, and is the baseline hazard rate at 
time t. j is the index for an individual firm, and  is a vector of independent variables, 
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which includes VC firm±related factors, portfolio company±related factors, and other 
control variables.  are coefficients to be estimated through the maximum likelihood 
method. The Cox model makes no assumptions about the distribution of the hazard rate, 
and can take any shape (i.e. they could be increasing or decreasing functions). 
 
In our analysis of investment performance, we use the computed time to exit as the 
dependent variable. The ³survival´ time in years is either the time between the first 
investment date, the exit date, or the difference between the investment date and 31 
March 2012. We do not consider the not-yet-exited deals as being unsuccessful, but 
rather treat them as being ³right-censored.´ 
Analysis 
Directorship and VC firm characteristics 
Univariate analysis 
Before moving on to the analysis of the potential benefits of directorship in S&P 1500 
companies that accrue to VC firms, we are interested in the initiation of the process, i.e., 
what characteristics of VC firms make them more likely to build such connections with 
large public companies? We first examine whether or not there is a difference between 
VC firms with and those without directorships in terms of their characteristics. Table 3 
shows a comparison between these two groups. As shown in the table, VC firms with 
directorships were in general more reputable and larger than those without, as measured 
by IPO market share, VC investment share, and firm size. In terms of firm type, VC 
firms with directorships were mainly independent, while VC firms without directorships 
had higher proportions of ³FDSWLYH´ VC firms (CVCs; i.e. those affiliated with 
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corporations, banks, or governments). This is not surprising, because having directors 
from independent VC firms sitting on the board will lead to fewer conflicts of interest 
than having directors from CVC firms, especially corporate firms, which are likely 
subsidiaries of their competitors. This explains why only three percent of directors on 
the boards of S&P 1500 companies in our sample were found to be from CVCs. Nearly 
50 percent of the sample VC firms with directorships were headquartered in the venture 
hotbeds of California and New York State. VC firms without directorships, on the other 
hand, were relatively more geographically scattered. 
  
Overall, thus, our results suggest that VC firms with directorships are larger and more 
reputable; mostly not affiliated with corporations, banks, or governments; and are based 
mainly in California or New York. The results so far, however, do not necessarily imply 
that such VC characteristics lead to directorships in S&P 1500 companies. Therefore, in 
the next section we test whether or not these characteristics cause VC firms to obtain 
directorships, while controlling for other determinants.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Multivariate analysis 
 
In this section, we test whether certain characteristics of VC firms lead to directorships 
in S&P 1500 companies, controlling for the variables shown in Table 3. The dependent 
variable in these models is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a specific VC 
firm obtained at least one directorship in an S&P 1500 company, and zero otherwise. 
These regressions control for size effect, firm location, firm types, and year-fixed effects. 
The main explanatory variable we are interested in is VC firm reputation (Nahata, 2008). 
We use IPO market share and VC investment share as two measures of VC firm 
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reputation. IPO market share is the dollar market value of all companies taken public by 
the VC firm from the beginning of calendar year 1980 until a given calendar year, 
normalized by the aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies that went public 
from the beginning of 1980 up until the same calendar year. VC investment share is the 
dollar investment from the beginning of 1980 up until a given calendar year, normalized 
by the overall aggregate investment in the VC industry in those years. We also examine 
whether older, larger, and independent VC firms, and those based in venture hubs, are 
more likely to obtain directorships.  
 
Model 1 presents regression estimates with VC reputation as measured by IPO market 
share. The coefficient of IPO market share is positive and significant at 1 percent, 
indicating that more reputable VC firms are more likely to obtain directorships in S&P 
1500 companies. Model 2 examines an alternative measure of VC reputation. The 
coefficient of the VC investment share is positive and significant at 1 percent, which is 
consistent with the results of Model 1. In Model 3, we include both measures of 
reputation, and the results are consistent with our Hypothesis 1. In all three models we 
include 9& ILUPV¶ age, size, type, and location to examine whether or not these 
characteristics also influence the likelihood of becoming directors in S&P 1500 
companies. The results indicate that larger, independent VC firms, and those based in 
venture hubs, are more likely to obtain directorships, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. The results also indicate, however, that younger VC firms are more likely 
to obtain directorships in S&P 1500 companies, which is inconsistent with our 
hypothesis. Our explanation is that younger VC firms are more motivated to build up 
their reputations through holding directorships in large public companies, while older 
and more established VC firms have less incentive to do so. This explanation is similar 
21 
 
to Gompers¶V (1996) ³grandstanding´ theory, which suggests that young VC firms take 
companies public earlier than older VC firms do in order to establish their reputation.  
 
Overall, our results show that more reputable and larger VC firms are more likely to 
obtain board seats in S&P 1500 companies, and that independent VC firms, based in 
venture capital hubs, are more likely to obtain directorships than are CVC firms and 
those based in other U.S. states.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Directorships and fundraising 
In the previous section, we examined the characteristics that determine the likelihood of 
becoming directors in S&P 1500 companies. Now we move on to the potential benefits 
that accrue to VC firms with directorships in S&P 1500 companies. We conduct our 
analysis in two steps. First, we compare VC firms with directorships with those without 
them to see if any significant difference exists between these two groups. The 
differences we found in the first step, however, may be due to a treatment effect, a 
selection effect, or both. Under the treatment effect, VC firms do benefit from their 
directorships in large public companies in terms of knowledge, experience, credibility, 
and visibility, which may lead to better fundraising and investment performance. Under 
the selection effect, S&P 1500 companies only recruit people to sit on their boards from 
reputable, experienced VC firms with good track records, in order to add value to the 
corporation. In other words, VC firms with directorships are essentially good VC firms 
in the first place, and the difference is not due to their holding directorships in S&P 
1500 companies. It is also possible that both effects exist, since they are not mutually 
exclusive. That is to say, high-quality VC firms are more likely to obtain directorships 
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in large public companies and such directorships, in return, are beneficial to them, and 
thus make these VC firms even better. In order to test for a treatment effect, in the 
second step we focus only on VC firms with directorships and test if there is a 
significant difference between pre- and post-directorship periods in terms of fundraising 
and investment performance. Overall, our first step attempted to identify a potential 
treatment effect; step two aims to confirm its existence.  
 
Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani¶V study (2012) suggested a few potential benefits of 
holding directorships in large public companies that may accrue to VC firms, such as 
enhanced networks and reputation, greater visibility, and access to detailed knowledge 
of R&D efforts. In this study, we focus on two primary functions of VC firms: 
fundraising and funding portfolio companies. In the following sections, we examine 
whether or not holding directorships the boards of S&P 1500 companies facilitates VC 
firms to raise more funds and thus improve their investment performance. 
Univariate analysis 
Table 5 provides a univariate analysis of directorships and 9& ILUPV¶ fundraising 
abilities. The measures we use are fund size and target size. Fund size is equal to the 
average size of all funds a VC firm raised during the sampling period (1980- 2013). The 
target amount is the average of all target amounts set by a VC firm during the sampling 
period. While fund size measures the objective results of fundraising, target size 
captures 9&ILUPV¶ subjective perception. Panel A provides a comparison between VC 
firms with and those without directorships to test whether a difference exists between 
them in terms of fund and target sizes. The results show that the funds raised by VC 
firms with directorships was triple that of VC firms without directorships. Similarly, the 
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target size of VC firms with directorships was double the target amount of VC firms 
without directorships. The t-tests for these three measures are all significant, at 1 
percent. The results indicate that not only are VC firms with directorships more 
confident (i.e., they set higher targets), but they are also better able to achieve their 
targets (i.e., they have larger fund sizes) compared to VC firms without directorships. 
The difference between VC firms with directorships and those without directorships 
does not suggest, however, that there is a treatment effect. This difference may occur 
because VC firms with directorships are essentially of high quality and thus are able to 
raise more funds, even without directorships.  
 
Panel B aims to test if a treatment effect exists by comparing pre- and post-directorship 
fundraising. The results show that VC firms are able to raise more funds after obtaining 
a presence on the boards of directors of S&P 1500 companies. Similarly, the 
post-directorship target size is also higher. Panel C uses the difference-in-difference 
method to account for a potential industry effect. The results show that, on average, VC 
firms raised $205 million more than the industry average in the post-directorship period, 
but raised only $23 million above the industry average prior to obtaining directorships; 
this difference is significant at 1 percent. The results are similar for target size. Our 
results suggest that VC firms set higher targets and are able to raise more funds in the 
post-directorship period, even after controlling for the industry effect. 
Overall, our results indicate that VC firms with directorships perform better than 
their counterparts without directorships in terms of fundraising, and that this ability 
results from their involvement in large public companies. We suggest that the main 
reason for this finding is that having a presence on the boards of large public companies 
provides networks, visibility, and creditability to VC professionals, which in turn 
24 
 
improves their ability to raise funds.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
3.4.2.2 Multivariate analysis  
We now use a multivariate analysis to confirm the results of the univariate analysis 
above that having a presence on the boards of S&P 1500 companies leads to better 
fundraising performance for a VC firm. We use the Heckman two-stage model to 
estimate two equations. The first equation is the probability of raising a certain amount 
of funds in a given year; the second is the amount raised, assuming that the funds were 
raised in that particular year. Models 1 and 3 include all VC firms, i.e., those with and 
without directorships. The main independent variable we are interested in is 
directorship, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a specific VC firm had 
directors on S&P 1500 company boards, and zero otherwise. We also control for other 
VC firm characteristics such as age, size, type, and location, and year fixed effects. The 
results indicate that having directors sitting on the board of mature public companies 
leads to more funds being raised, as well as higher targets. These results from the 
multivariate analysis are consistent with those of the univariate analysis. In terms of 
other VC characteristics, we find that older and larger VC firms are more likely to raise 
more funds and to set higher targets. Although the results indicate that a significant 
difference exists between VC firms with and those without directorships in terms of 
fundraising, as discussed above, the difference may be attributable to a selection effect. 
We run additional tests to address this concern. 
 
Models 2 and 4 focus only on VC firms with directorships to test whether or not having 
a presence on the boards of large public companies improved these ILUPV¶ fundraising 
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performance. The main independent variable we are interested in is post-directorship, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a particular firm-year was during the 
post-directorship period, and zero otherwise. As shown in the table, post-directorship is 
positively and significantly related to both fund size and target size, suggesting that VC 
firms do perform better in terms of fundraising after their officers become directors of 
S&P 1500 companies. The results for other VC characteristics are similar to those of 
Models 1 and 3, i.e., larger and older VC firms are more likely to raise more funds and 
to set higher targets. 
 
Overall, the multivariate results show that holding a directorship in an S&P 1500 
company leads to better performance in terms of fundraising: VC firms are able to raise 
more funds and set higher targets after they have obtained directorships on the boards of 
S&P 1500 companies. The network and visibility provided by the directorships add 
significant value to 9&ILUPV¶ follow-up fundraising abilities. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Directorships and investment performance  
As discussed, our goal is to examine whether or not having a presence on the boards of 
mature public companies benefits VC firms in terms of their two main functions, raising 
funds and making investments. In this section, we test whether or not holding 
directorships leads to better investment performance, as measured by the likelihood of 
successful exits, either via IPOs or M&As (Nahata, 2008; Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Zarutskie, 2010; Dai et al., 2012).  
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Univariate analysis 
Table 7 presents the univariate analysis of directorship and VC investment performance. 
Panel A provides a comparison between the investment performance of VC firms with 
and those without directorships. As shown in the table, 11 percent of the firms in which 
investments were made by VC firms with directorships went public, as opposed to only 
7 percent of firms in which investments were made by VC firms without directorships. 
In terms of M&As, 27.7 percent of the investments made by VC firms with 
directorships were exited through M&As, while only 19.7 percent were made by VC 
firms without directorships. The percentage of all successful exits of VC firms with 
directorships thus was nearly 12 percent higher than that of VC firms without 
directorships. This result alone, however, does not suggest that directorships improve 
9& ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW SHUIRUPDQFH It might also be the case that VC firms with 
directorships would be able, even without directorships, to take portfolio companies to 
successful exits. Therefore, in Panel B, we compare the pre-directorship with the 
post-directorship period by focussing only on VC firms with directorships. These results 
indicate that 40 percent of investments made during the post-directorship period were 
exited successfully, compared to 37 percent of investments made during the 
pre-directorship periods. The difference is significant, at 5 percent. 
  
Overall, our results suggest that investments made by VC firms with directorships in 
S&P 1500 companies have higher success rates than those without such directorships. 
This better investment performance is due (at least in part) to their holding directorships, 
because the detailed knowledge of products and markets of large public companies that 
they gain is of considerable value in assessing and coaching their portfolio companies, 
which consequently improves their investment performance. 
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[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
3.4.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we test whether having a presence on the boards of S&P 1500 companies 
leads to better VC firm investment performance. Our analysis is carried out at the 
company level, with only one observation for each portfolio company. We use two 
measures to estimate investment performance, i.e., the likelihood of a successful exit, 
and the length of time to exit. The dependent variable in Models 1±3 is a dummy that 
takes the value of one if the portfolio company ultimately went public or was acquired 
by the end of 2012, and zero if otherwise; the dependent variable in Models 4±6 is the 
length of time to exit, calculated by taking the difference between the year in which the 
portfolio company received its initial funding and the observation year, or the end of 
2012. Models 1 and 4 include all VC firms, while Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 only include VC 
firms with directorships. The main independent variables we are interested in are 
directorship, post-directorship, and directorship length. Directorship is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a particular portfolio company was backed by at 
least one VC firm with a directorship in an S&P 1500 company, and zero otherwise. 
Post-directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the year in which 
the portfolio company received its initial funding was during the post-directorship 
period, and zero otherwise. Directorship length is the number of years of directorships 
in S&P 1500 companies at the time of investment. In the case of multiple investors, we 
take the average of their directorship length. Since the issue of VC exits has been 
studied extensively by previous studies, we include most of the control variables used in 
previous studies, such as characteristics of VC firms and investee companies, venture 
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stages, )and VC syndication. 8 We also include year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects. 
As shown in Table 8, in Models 1 and 4, directorship is positively related to the 
likelihood of successful exits and times to exit, and is significant, at 1 percent. The 
results indicate that having a presence on the board of large public companies leads to 
improved VC firm investment performance. The control variables are mostly consistent 
with results of previous studies. For instance, early-stage and seed-stage ventures are 
less likely to be exited; a large syndicate size leads to better performance; and a larger 
investment size contributes positively to the likelihood of a successful exit. This 
difference, however, may be attributable to a selection effect: VC firms with 
directorships are of high quality, and thus would be able to bring portfolio companies to 
successful exits, even without directorships. We therefore conduct an additional analysis 
to test if there is a treatment effect. In Models 2, 3, 5, and 6, we focus only on VC firms 
with directorships. As shown in the table, both post-directorship and directorship length 
are positively related to the likelihood of successful exits and times to exit, and both are 
significant, at 5 percent. These results indicate that VC firms do benefit from holding 
directorships in large public companies, and that their investment performance is 
improved (at least in part) as a result thereof. 
Overall, our results show that not only do VC firms with directorships tend to 
perform better than do VC firms without directorships in terms of successful exits, but 
also that holding directorships LQDODUJHSXEOLFFRPSDQ\LPSURYHV9&ILUPV¶DELOLWLHVWR
take portfolio companies to successful exits.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
                                                             
8 For relevant use of these variables, see. Elisabete et al (2008), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Lerner (1994), Giot and Schwienbacher (2007).  
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether or not having a presence on the boards of mature 
public companies benefits VC firms. We investigate potential benefits from the 
perspective of fundraising and investment performance. First, we posit that holding 
directorships in mature public companies provides enhanced networks, visibility, and 
credibility to VC firms, and therefore increases their ability to raise more funds. The 
second issue we examine is investment performance. We postulate that having a 
presence on the boards of mature public companies provides VC professionals access to 
better knowledge and experience of the product, market, and the industry, which can be 
transferred to their portfolio companies and thereby improve their investment 
performance. 
Our empirical results show that VCs from reputable, high-quality VC firms are 
more likely to become directors in S&P 1500 companies, and that having a presence on 
the boards of such mature public companies brings considerable benefit to these VC 
firms in terms of fundraising and investment performance, while controlling for a 
matched sample of VC firms without directorships. We found that VC firms not only 
raise more funds, but also set higher targets after their officers become directors, 
suggesting that directorships provide visibility, networks, and credibility to VC firms. 
We also find that holding directorships increases the likelihood of successful exits of 
9& ILUPV¶ SRUWIROLR FRPSDQLHV WKXV LQGLFDWLQJ WKDW GLUHFWRUVKLSV Srovide VC firms 
access to knowledge and increased learning opportunities.  
Our study extends Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani¶V ZRUNE\H[DPLQLQJ
another side of the VC firm/S&P 1500 company relationship, and raises a few 
interesting questions for future research. For instance, how are these VC directors 
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selected? Are they invited or sent by VC firms?9 Do these VC directors gain personal 
benefits, such as compensation or other non-cash rewards? Could sitting on boards be 
detrimental to VC firms if they have too many directors in large public companies, and 
thus are distracted from their primary responsibilities? How do they balance their roles 
in large public companies with those in small private companies? Future studies that 
examine these questionVZRXOGLPSURYHRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI9&ILUPV¶UROHVLQPDWXUH
companies.  
Our study also provides several practical implications for market practitioners. For 
instance, VC firms should view gaining directorships (in addition to grandstanding) as a 
means of reputation-building and as an opportunity to gain access to better knowledge 
and expertise. By sending officers of VC firms to large public companies, or hiring 
partners who already hold board seats, VC firms could gain credibility and enhanced 
networks, as well as better knowledge and expertise, which would then improve both 
their fundraising abilities and investment performance. 
                                                             
9
 Although we provide some evidence of VC firm level in our analysis, we do not examine the 
characteristics of individual VC directors, such as their work experience, education, and networks. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
Variable name Definition of variable 
Directorship 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC 
firm had partners sitting on the boards of S&P 1500 
companies, and zero if the VC firm had never obtained 
any directorships during the sampling period. 
Post-directorship 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC 
firm had existing directorships in S&P 1500 
companies, and zero if the VC firm had not yet 
obtained directorships. This is only applied to VC 
firms that had obtained directorships during their 
lifetimes. 
Directorship length 
The number of years between the year in which the VC 
firm obtained its directorships and the observation 
year. This is applied only for VC firms that had 
directorships during their lifetimes. 
IPO market share 
This is measured as the dollar market value of all 
companies taken public by the VC firm from the 
beginning of calendar year 1980 up until a given 
calendar year, normalized by the aggregate market 
value of all VC-backed companies that went public 
during those years. 
VC investment share 
The dollar investment made by a VC firm from the 
beginning of 1980 up until a given calendar year, 
normalized by the overall aggregate investment in the 
VC industry in those years. 
VC firm age This is PHDVXUHGE\WKHSHULRGEHWZHHQ9&ILUPV¶\HDU
of incorporation and the observation year. 
VC firm size 
7KLV LV D 9& ILUP¶V FDSLWDO XQGHU PDQDJHPHQW LQ D
particular year, calculated by taking the sum of all 
previous funds raised by the VC firm. 
Independent VC 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC 
firm was not affiliated with any other entities, and zero 
otherwise. 
VC based in venture 
hotbeds 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC 
firm was based in either California or New York. 
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Table 1. Continued 
 
Seed/Start-up venture 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
venture was in the seed/start-up stage when it received 
its initial funding, and 0 otherwise. 
Early-stage venture 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
venture was in the early stage when it received its initial 
funding, and 0 otherwise. 
Expansion-stage venture 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
venture was in the expansion stage when it received its 
initial funding, and 0 otherwise. 
Syndicate size The total number of VC firms invested in the portfolio 
company. 
Total funding received The total amount of funding received by a portfolio 
company across all rounds. 
GDP growth in the 
previous year 
The GDP growth of the United States in the previous 
year. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWVWKHGHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVRI9&ILUPV¶GLUHFWRUVKLSVLQ6	3
companies. PanHO$GHVFULEHV9&ILUPV¶DQG9&GLUHFWRUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQZLWK6	3
FRPSDQLHV3DQHO%GHVFULEHV9&GLUHFWRUV¶H[SHULHQFHLQ9&ILUPVDQG6	3
 FRPSDQLHV 3DQHO & GHVFULEHV 9& GLUHFWRUV¶ UROHV ZLWKLQ 9& ILUPV RU 6	3
FRPSDQLHV9&GLUHFWRUVZKRVtarted as directors and then joined/started the 
VC firms constituted less than 15 percent of our sample, and therefore our main 
focus is VC directors who started with a VC firm before becoming a director in one 
or more S&P 1500 companies. 
 
Panel A: VC firms and S&P 1500 
  Mean Median Max 
No. of S&P 1500 companies per VC firm is associated 
with 2.539 1.000 25.000 
No. of S&P1500 companies per director is associated 
with 0.893 1.000 6.000 
No. of directors per VC firm has that sit on the board of 
S&P 1500 1.941 1.000 18.000 
No. of directors per S&P 1500 company has on board 1.329 1.000 5.000 
Panel B: VC directors' experience 
  Mean Median Max 
Year in which the VC became a director in S&P 1500 1999 1999 2011 
Year in which the VC joined/started the VC firm 1997 1998 2012 
No. of  years of experience in S&P 1500 before joining 
the VC firmЪ 5.988 4.500 30.000 
No. of years of experience in  VC firm before joining 
the S&P 1500 7.396 5.000 36.000 
Panel C: VC directors' role 
  N %   
VC directors' role in the VC firm       
    Founder, Co-Founder  491 37.20%   
    Other job titles 829 62.80%   
VC directors' role in S&P 1500       
    Chairman, Vice Chairman 94 7.12%   
    Chief officers (CEO,CFO,COO) 110 8.33%   
    President, Vice President 127 9.62%   
    Other job titles 1083 82.05%   
Directorship classification       
    Employee 74 5.66%   
    Linked 215 16.45%   
    Independent 1017 77.81%   
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Table 3: Directorships and 9&ILUPV¶ characteristics 
 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWVDQDQDO\VLVRI9&ILUPV¶Fharacteristics based on two groups: VC firms with directorships and VC firms without directorships. 
Column 1 is on VC firms with directorships; Column 2 is on VC firms without directorships; Column 3 is the difference between Columns 1 and 2; 
Column 4 is t-statistics; and Column 5 is the p-value. IPO market share is the dollar market value of all companies taken public by the VC firm from 
the beginning of calendar year 1980 up until a given calendar year, normalized by the aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies that went 
public from the beginning of 1980 up until the same calendar year. VC investment share is the dollar investment from the beginning of 1980 up until 
a given calendar year, normalized by the overall aggregate investment in the VC industry in those years. VC firm age was measured by the period 
EHWZHHQ9&ILUPV¶\HDURILQFRUSRUDWLRQDQGWKHREVHUYDWLRQ\HDUVC firm size LVWKH9&ILUP¶VFDSLWDOXQGHUPDQDJHPHQWLQDSDUWLFXODU\HDU
calculated by taking the sum of all previous funds raised by the VC firm. Independent VC firm is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
VC firm was not affiliated with any other entities, and zero otherwise. VC based in venture hubs is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
VC firm was based in either California or New York State. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
VC firms with 
directorships (1) 
VC firms without 
directorships (2) 
Difference 
(3) = (2)-(1) t-statistics p-Value 
VC reputation           
    IPO market share 0.062% 0.010% -0.052% -41.127 0.000*** 
    VC investment share 0.328% 0.052% -0.275% -92.435 0.000*** 
VC characteristics           
    VC firm age (no. of years) 12.511 15.694 3.182 6.724 0.000*** 
    VC firm size ($ millions) 1,566.662 233.051 -1,333.611 -53.600 0.000*** 
Firm type           
    Independent VC firm (Indicator) 99.129% 52.582% -46.548% -120.000 0.000*** 
    Other types of VC firm (Indicator) 0.871% 47.418% 146.548% 120.000 0.000*** 
Firm location           
    VC firms based in venture hubs (Indicator) 48.046% 36.224% -11.821% -29.785 0.000*** 
    VC firms based in other states (Indicator) 51.954% 63.776% 111.821% 29.785 0.000*** 
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Table 4: Likelihood of becoming directors 
 
This table presents the regression analysis of the likelihood of VC firms obtaining directorships in S&P 1500 companies. All models were 
estimated using logistic regression. The dependent variable in all models is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm obtained 
directorship in that particular year, and zero otherwise. Models 1 and 2 examine each reputation measure separately, and Model 3 aggregates two 
measures in one model. IPO market share is the dollar market value of all companies taken public by the VC firm from the beginning of calendar 
year 1980 up until a given calendar year, normalized by the aggregate market value of all VC-backed companies that went public from the 
beginning of 1980 up until the same calendar year. VC investment share is the dollar investment from the beginning of year 1980 up until a given 
calendar year, normalized by the overall aggregate investment in the VC industry in those years. VC firm age was measured by the period 
EHWZHHQ9&ILUPV¶\HDURILQFRUSRUDWLRQDQd the observation year. VC firm size LVWKH9&ILUP¶VFDSLWDOXQGHUPDQDJHPHQWLQDSDUWLFXODU\HDU
calculated by taking the sum of all previous funds raised by the VC firm. Independent VC firm is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the VC firm was not affiliated with any other entities, and zero otherwise. VC based in venture hubs is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the VC firm was based in either California or New York State, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Likelihood of becoming directors 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VC reputation             
    IPO market share  47.310*** (0.000)    - - 25.320*    (0.069)    
    VC investment share - - 30.000*** (0.000)    28.850*** (0.000)    
VC characteristics             
    VC firm age (years) -0.073*** (0.000)    -0.077*** (0.000)    -0.082*** (0.000)    
    VC firm size ($ millions) 0.001*** (0.000)    0.001*** (0.000)    0.001*** (0.000)    
    Independent VC firm (Indicator) 5.398*** (0.000)    5.399*** (0.000)    5.333*** (0.000)    
    VC based in venture hubs (Indicator) 0.431*** (0.000)    0.398*** (0.000)    0.387*** (0.000)    
Year fixed effects Present Present Present 
Log likelihood -2369.6 -2401.1 -2357.8 
Pseudo R squared 0.128 0.131 0.133 
Number of observations 63,949 63,949 63,949 
38 
 
Table 5: Directorship and VC fundraising²Univariate analysis 
This table presents a univariate analysis of directorships and VC fundraising. Panel A compares VC firms with directorships 
with those VC firms without directorships. Panel B focusses only on VC firms with directorships and compares 
pre-directorship fundraising with post-directorship fundraising. Panel C addresses the industry effect concern by using the 
difference-in-difference method. Fund size is the average size of all funds a VC firm raised during the sampling period (1980 
to 2013). Target size is the average of all target amounts set by a VC firm during the sampling period. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: VC firms with directorship vs. VC firms without directorships 
  All VC firms VC firms with directorships 
VC firms without 
directorships 
Comparison between with- 
and without- directorship VC 
firms 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean t-statistics p-value 
Fund size 4,693 105.956 527 256.042 4,166 86.970 -14.435 0.000*** 
Target size 2,691 150.216 446 258.649 2,245 128.674 -9.125 0.000*** 
Panel B: Pre-directorship vs. Post-directorship 
  
VC firms with 
directorships Post-directorship Pre-directorship 
Comparison between pre- and 
post-directorship VC firms 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean t-statistics p-value 
Fund size 527 256.042 527 469.138 527 224.708 -6.757 0.000*** 
Target size 446 258.649 446 828.765 446 340.101 -5.921 0.000*** 
Panel C: Pre-directorship vs. Post-directorship (difference in difference) 
  
VC firms with 
directorships Post-directorship Pre-directorship 
Comparison between pre-and 
post-directorship VC firms 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean t-statistics p-value 
Fund size 527 14.992 527 205.261 527 22.977 -4.018 0.000*** 
Target size 446 51.433 446 246.228 446 40.297 -2.417 0.017** 
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Table 6: Directorship and VC fundraising²Multivariate analysis 
This table presents a regression analysis of directorships and VC fundraising. All models were estimated using the Heckman two-stage model, where 
the first stage is the probability that a fund was raised in a given year, and the second stage is the amount raised/target set, given that the funds were 
raised in a particular year. All VC firms were included in each model. The dependent variable is either the natural logarithm of the amount of the 
raised funds (fund size) or the natural logarithm of the target size set by the VC firm (target size). Models 1 and 3 include all VC firms, while Models 
2 and 4 only include VC firms with directorships. Directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the VC firm had at least one partner 
sitting on the board of an S&P 1500 company, and zero otherwise. Post-directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the observation 
year was during the post-directorship period. VC firm age is PHDVXUHGE\WKHSHULRGEHWZHHQ9&ILUPV¶\HDURILQFRUSRUDWLRQDQGWKHREVHUYDWLRQ\HDU
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Fund size Target size 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Second stage: size of funds raised / target size                 
9&ILUPV¶GLUHFWRUVKLS                 
    Directorship (Indicator) 0.338*** (0.000)  - - 0.383*** (0.000)  - - 
    Post-directorship (Indicator) - - 0.244*** (0.000)  - - 0.200*** (0.000)  
VC characteristics                 
    VC firm age (years) 0.142*** (0.000)  0.047*** (0.000)  0.087*** (0.000)  0.035*** (0.000)  
    VC firm size ($ millions) 0.001**   (0.012)  0.001***   (0.000)  0.001   (0.347)  0.001***   (0.000)  
    Independent VC (Indicator) 0.089**  (0.004)  0.342    (0.198)  -0.142*** (0.000)  0.736***  (0.008)  
    VC based in venture hubs (Indicator) -0.075    (0.110)   0.133*    (0.079)  -0.033    (0.460)  0.196***  (0.005)  
First stage: likelihood of raising funds                 
    VC firm age (years) -0.041*** (0.000)  -0.019*** (0.000)  -0.033*** (0.000)  -0.019*** (0.000)  
    VC firm size ($ millions) 0.001***   (0.000)  0.001***   (0.000)  0.001***   (0.000)  0.001***   (0.000)  
    VC based in venture hubs (Indicator) 0.097*** (0.000)  -0.003    (0.919)  0.112*** (0.000)  0.002    (0.948)  
    GDP growth in the previous year 0.015*** (0.000)  0.035*** (0.000)  -0.002   (0.546)  0.032*** (0.000)  
Year fixed effects Present Present Present Present 
p-value of Chi-squared test (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Number of observations 70,343 10,121 66,104 9,238 
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Table 7: Directorship and VC investment performance²Univariate analysis 
This table presents a univariate analysis of directorship and VC investment performance. Panel A compares VC firms with 
directorships with those VC firms without directorships. Panel B focusses only on VC firms with directorships, and compares 
pre-directorship investment performance with post-directorship investment performance. All investments were made during 
1980±2009; we track the outcome of each investment until the end of 2012, allowing at least three years for each investment to be 
exited. Successful exits (%) is the percentage of all investments that were exited through either IPO or M&A; we consider both IPOs 
and M&As as successful exits. Time to successful exits is calculated by taking the difference between the year a portfolio company 
received its first funding and the exit year, or the end of 2012. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: VC firms with directorship vs. VC firms without directorships 
  All VC firms VC firms with directorships 
VC firms without 
directorships 
Comparison between with- 
and without-directorship 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean t-statistics p-value 
All successful exits 23,434 0.321 9,939 0.390 13,495 0.270 -19.482 0.000*** 
IPO exits 23,434 0.090 9,939 0.113 13,495 0.073 -10.508 0.000*** 
M&A exits 23,434 0.231 9,939 0.277 13,495 0.197 -14.352 0.000*** 
Panel B: Pre-directorship vs. Post-directorship 
  
All VC firms with 
directorships Post-directorship Pre-directorship 
Comparison between pre- 
and post-directorship 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean t-statistics p-value 
All successful exits 9,939 0.390 7,336 0.396 2,603 0.371 -2.202 0.028** 
IPO exits 9,939 0.113 7,336 0.092 2,603 0.172 11.205 0.000*** 
M&A exits 9,939 0.277 7,336 0.304 2,603 0.199 -10.328 0.000*** 
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Table 8: Directorship and investment performance 
This table presents the regression analysis of directorship and investment performance, as measured by the likelihood of successful exits or times to exit. All 
VC firms were included in Models 1 and 4. Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 only include VC firms with directorships. This is a company-level analysis, with only one 
observation for each portfolio company. Models 1, 2, and 3 are estimated using logit regression, while Models 3, 4, and 5 were estimated using the Cox 
hazard model. The dependent variable in Models 1±3 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company was exited through either IPO or M&A 
by the end of 2012, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Models 3±6 is the time to exit, calculated by taking the difference between the year in 
which the portfolio company received its initial funding and the observation year, or the end of 2012. Companies that had not yet exited were treated as 
³right-censored.´ Directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the portfolio company received funding from at least one VC firm with 
directorships, and zero otherwise. Post-directorship is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the year in which a portfolio company received its 
initial funding was during the post-directorship period, and zero otherwise. Directorship length is the number of years between the year in which a VC firm 
obtained directorships and the observation year. The definitions of control variables are provided in Table 1. Year and industry dummies are included to 
control for year and industry fixed effects, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Likelihood of successful exits Times to exit 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
9&ILUP¶VGLUHFWRUVKLS                         
Directorship 0.158*** (0.000)          0.163*** (0.000)          
 Post-directorship     0.132**   (0.034)          0.088*    (0.057)      
 Directorship length         0.011**   (0.019)          0.008**   (0.020)  
VC firm characteristics                         
 VC firm age 0.012    (0.530)  0.003    (0.938)  -0.015    (0.666)  0.019    (0.206)  0.015    (0.549)  0.003    (0.925)  
 VC firm reputation 4.669    (0.154)  8.037    (0.114)  8.641*    (0.088)  4.028*    (0.077)  7.290*    (0.059)  7.760**   (0.042)  
 Based in venture hotbeds 0.136*** (0.000)  0.111**   (0.028)  0.104**   (0.039)  0.139*** (0.000)  0.104***  (0.006)  0.098***  (0.010)  
Venture stage                         
 Seed/start-up stage -0.385*** (0.000)  -0.304***  (0.005) -0.308***  (0.005)  -0.371*** (0.000)  -0.307*** (0.000)  -0.310*** (0.000)  
 Early stage  -0.247*** (0.000)  -0.178*    (0.092)  -0.183*   (0.084)  -0.244*** (0.000)  -0.186**   (0.027)  -0.190**   (0.024)  
 Expansion stage  -0.239**  (0.001)  -0.197*    (0.077)  -0.201* (0.071)  -0.241*** (0.000)  -0.197**   (0.026)  -0.200**   (0.025)  
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Table 8. Continued 
 
Other control variables                         
 VC syndicate size 0.068*** (0.000)  0.062*** (0.000)  0.062*** (0.000)  0.058*** (0.000)  0.054*** (0.000)  0.054*** (0.000)  
 Corporate VC 0.065    (0.211)  0.003    (0.970)  -0.001 (0.989)  0.091**   (0.024)  0.032    (0.599)  0.033    (0.586)  
 Bank VC 
-0.177***  (0.001)  -0.113    (0.210)  -0.106    (0.239)  -0.119***  (0.006)  -0.065    (0.350)  -0.059    (0.395)  
 Total funding 0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  0.001*** (0.000)  
Year fixed effects Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Industry fixed effects Present Present Present Present Present Present 
Log-likelihood -11985.969 -5882.719 -5882.157 -65055.484 -32358.902 -32358.121 
Pseudo R squared 0.085 0.074 0.074 - - - 
Number of observations 20,458 9,450 9,450 20,458 9,450 9,450 
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Table 9: Correlation matrix 
This table shows the pair-wise correlations matrix of the independent variables used in the logit and Cox models in Tables 4, 6, and 8. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1)     VC firm age (years) 1.000                       
(2)     VC firm size ($ millions) 0.120 1.000                     
(3)     Independent VC (I) 0.007 -0.043 1.000                   
(4)     VC based in venture hubs (I) 0.145 0.104 -0.044 1.000                 
(5)     Seed/start-up venture -0.028 -0.031 0.016 0.023 1.000               
(6)     Early-stage venture -0.008 -0.023 0.000 0.064 -0.552 1.000             
(7)     Expansion-stage venture 0.032 0.031 -0.017 -0.065 -0.351 -0.463 1.000           
(8)     Syndicate size 0.004 0.035 -0.409 0.245 0.013 0.035 -0.043 1.000         
(9)     Total funding received  0.131 0.140 -0.156 0.189 -0.275 0.123 0.115 0.351 1.000       
(10)     IPO market conditions 0.010 0.049 0.001 0.031 0.026 -0.027 0.002 0.045 0.021 1.000     
(11)     Directorship (I) 0.289 0.070 0.103 0.232 -0.010 0.083 -0.077 0.188 0.271 0.040 1.000   
(12)     Directorship length (years) 0.357 0.035 0.093 0.236 -0.012 0.081 -0.069 0.161 0.238 -0.008 0.744 1.000 
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Appendix 
Table 1: VC firms¶ directorship by year 
 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWV869&ILUPV¶GLUHFWRUVKLSs in S&P 1500 companies from 1985 to 2012. 
The number of VC firms with directorships, the number of VC firms without directorships, 
the percentage of VC firms with directorships, the percentage of VC firms without 
directorships, and the total number of VC firms are presented. Figure 1 is based on this table, 
and is presented below. The line represents the percentage of VC firms with directorships, 
and the bars represent the number of VC firms with directorships. 
 
Year 
No. of VC 
firms with 
directorships 
No. of VC 
firms without 
directorships 
% of VC 
firms with 
directorships 
% of VC 
firms without 
directorships 
Total no. of 
VC firms 
1985 0 2,489 0.000 100.000 2,489 
1986 5 2,656 0.188 99.812 2,661 
1987 12 2,795 0.428 99.572 2,807 
1988 33 2,896 1.127 98.873 2,929 
1989 51 3,061 1.639 98.361 3,112 
1990 67 3,140 2.089 97.911 3,207 
1991 81 3,240 2.439 97.561 3,321 
1992 86 3,386 2.477 97.523 3,472 
1993 105 3,506 2.908 97.092 3,611 
1994 131 3,649 3.466 96.534 3,780 
1995 170 3,880 4.198 95.802 4,050 
1996 212 4,118 4.896 95.104 4,330 
1997 261 4,387 5.615 94.385 4,648 
1998 323 4,667 6.473 93.527 4,990 
1999 386 5,230 6.873 93.127 5,616 
2000 434 5,808 6.953 93.047 6,242 
2001 494 6,059 7.539 92.461 6,553 
2002 547 6,384 7.892 92.108 6,931 
2003 589 6,540 8.262 91.738 7,129 
2004 624 6708 8.511 91.489 7,332 
2005 676 6913 8.908 91.092 7,589 
2006 709 7,124 9.051 90.949 7,833 
2007 756 7,316 9.366 90.634 8,072 
2008 799 7,492 9.637 90.363 8,291 
2009 826 7,674 9.718 90.282 8,500 
2010 855 7,812 9.865 90.135 8,667 
2011 875 7,940 9.926 90.074 8,815 
2012 883 8,056 9.878 90.122 8,939 
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Figure 1. VC firms¶ directorships by year 
 
Table 2: VC firms and their directorships in S&P 1500 firms²Top 20 
This table presents the top 20 VC firms with the largest number of directors on S&P 1500 firms. 
The number of directors on the boards of S&P 1500 firms, and the number of S&P 1500 firms they 
are associated with, are both presented.  
VC firm name No. of directors on S&P 1500 firms 
No. of S&P firms 
VC is associated 
with 
Warburg Pincus, LLC 18 25 
General Atlantic, LLC 13 24 
Bain Capital, Inc. 13 18 
The Carlyle Group, LP 11 18 
Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC 13 15 
Silver Lake Partners, LP 9 15 
TPG Capital, LP 15 14 
Sequoia Capital 8 14 
Thomas H. Lee Partners, LP 10 12 
Oak Hill Capital Management 9 12 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., LP 9 11 
Benchmark Capital Management 8 11 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice, LLC 8 11 
GSC Partners 8 11 
AEA Investors, LLC 9 10 
Irving Place Capital, LLC 9 10 
New Enterprise Associates, Inc. 9 10 
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers, LLC 8 9 
Blum Capital Partners, LP 7 8 
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